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In many European countries the average level of education has grown steadily over the
last few generations. The paper shows how such a trend can be easily rationalized by a
model that extends a standard signalling game in two directions. First, a temporal
structure is induced by having two different cohorts of individuals playing the game.
Second, to standard rational agents, the model postulates the existence of two classes of
agents that care about their relative position in the distribution of educational choices.
Conformist individuals wish to be close to the average level; status seeking individuals
seek to be above it. Results show that the presence of these two classes of individuals
generates an average level of education that changes and increases over time for a wide
range of choice of parameters. Consequences of this increasing level of education on
the behaviour of the firms are also explored.
JEL classifications: I20, D82.
1. Introduction
Over the past few decades, the average level of education increased steadily
in almost every European country. For example, Eurostat (2001) reported that in
2001, over 75% of individuals in the 25–29 year age group had completed at least
their upper secondary education compared with 52% of individuals in the 50–64
year age group. Further, Eurostat (2005) reported that the total number of grad-
uates in the EU25 increased by more than 30% during the period 1998–2003. The
causes contributing to the shaping of such important changes are obviously mani-
fold, including a favourable sociopolitical situation, increasing wealth, sustained
unemployment rates and rapid technological progress. In addition to these expla-
nations, this paper shows that recent educational dynamics are easily accounted for
by a simple signalling model (Spence, 1973) enriched by the presence of individuals
who care about their relative position in the educational distribution.
We argue that there are two kinds of reasons why people may care about their
relative level of education. First, there are material reasons related to the chance of
finding a suitably attractive job in the labour market. A consequence of the increase
of the general level of education has been a reduction in the ‘value’ of a given level of
schooling. For example, a bachelor’s degree two generations ago was a very valuable
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asset and an effective signal to the labour market. Today, the same degree is much
less informative and individuals need higher qualifications in order to differentiate
themselves from other applicants.
A second set of reasons relates to the social and psychological aspects associated
with the acquisition of education. The level of education is a signal that individuals
send not only to firms, but also to the rest of society. In many social contacts, there is
a favourable bias towards more educated individuals as people are usually willing to
interpret education as a proxy for qualities, such as ability, knowledge, and persist-
ence. In contrast, individuals with a low level of education are often judged unfavour-
ably, no matter what their effective abilities may be. Again, this social evaluation of a
given level of schooling depends on the average level of education in society.1
Therefore, an individual’s choice of his level of schooling must take into account
not only the absolute level of schooling acquired but more importantly his level of
schooling in relation to others in his cohort. This means that individual preferences
about education are interpersonally dependent, a feature which is usually neglected
by standard models of educational choices. To clarify how the effectiveness of this
double-signalling effect (towards the firms and towards the rest of society) is related
to the average level of education, consider the example of a student who obtains a
high grade on an important exam. The utility the student enjoys from such an
achievement is clearly influenced by the average grade of the class. If the average
grade is low, the signal the student sends to the teacher is more informative and
thus, more likely to help him during his scholastic career. At the same time, the
student sends a stronger signal to her colleagues. The perception of this second
component depends on the student’s preferences. For instance, his ego could be
gratified or the student could feel some embarrassment by standing out so clearly.
This paper focuses on the choice made by an individual about the level of his
education attainment by considering his innate characteristics, as well as his ambi-
tions. It combines a standard model of signalling with theories of social distance.
More precisely, the paper analyses educational dynamics in a heterogeneous popu-
lation of myopic agents who have different productivity as well as different attitudes
about their relative educational achievement. Some individuals, possibly the
majority, are not influenced by considerations of social distance (independent
individuals); some try to differentiate themselves from other agents and reach a
higher status (status-seeking individuals); others adopt a more conformist behav-
iour (conformist individuals).
The presence of non-selfish agents modifies considerably the standard results of
static signalling models.2 In particular, under very weak assumptions about the
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1 Individuals can be more or less sensitive to social pressures of this kind. For specific empirical evidence
about the effects that social considerations may have on educational choices see Cipollone and Rosolia
(2007).
2 Non-selfish agents are agents whose actions are influenced by the behaviour of some other individuals
or reference group. See for instance Fehr and Fischbacher (2002).
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composition of society, the model endogenously displays a growing level of average
education. For instance, education is likely to increase, even in a purely conformist
society, provided that the average productivity level is not too low. However, the
existence of agents with interdependent preferences, although necessary in the
context considered, is not sufficient to trigger some positive educational dynamics.
The model also rationalizes other stylized facts. In fact, as the level of average
education increases, the signals that workers send to the labour market can
become less informative and potentially harmful for the profitability of firms.
Therefore, employers progressively become more demanding when setting their
educational requirements, while myopic individuals who fail to anticipate this
trend are disappointed by the wages they are offered.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature;
Section 3 introduces and solves a repeated signalling game enriched with concerns
about social distance; Section 4 studies the dynamics of the average educational
level in society; Section 5 analyses the behaviour of firms; Section 6 concludes.
2. Related literature
In this paper, we provide an explanation for the increase in education over the last
few decades. This explanation is based on a signalling model enriched with theories
of social distance and interdependent preferences. This section briefly reviews
(some of ) the relevant literature in these three areas.
(i) The increase in education There are various reasons that may help to explain
the positive trend in the average levels of education attained in developed countries.
A first and fairly obvious explanation is that people study more because by doing so
they expect to receive higher wages. Indeed, the positive relationship between
schooling and earnings is generally confirmed (see for instance Ashenfelter et al.,
1999; and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004) by the estimation of Mincerian
equations.3 Related to wage expectations is the literature that focuses on the effects
that skill-biased technological progress has on the distribution of wages (see
Heckman et al., 1998). The idea here is that the wage gap between unskilled and
skilled workers has widened considerably in recent years, providing incentives for
acquiring a higher level of education.
From a social point of view, education can be seen as an investment in human
capital which has beneficial effects on economic growth (Barro, 2001).4 Indeed,
many government policies have been designed with the purpose of raising the
educational level in society. These policies include an increase and diversification
in the supply of education, subsidies and other incentives and an increase in the
years of compulsory schooling. On the demand side, individuals face a trade-off
..........................................................................................................................................................................
3 Jacob Mincer was the first one to empirically study the relation between schooling and labour income.
4 Becker (1993) offers a deep analysis of the effects that education, training, and on-the-job experience
have on an individual’s human capital.
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between studying and working which is affected by labour market conditions.
For instance, during periods of high unemployment, the opportunity cost of con-
tinuing in full-time education is lower. Empirical evidence about this relationship is
given in Giannelli and Monfardini (2003) and Dellas and Sakellaris (2003).
(ii) Signalling The concept of signalling was introduced in the seminal paper by
Spence (1973) and has since become an important branch of the so-called econom-
ics of information. Riley (2001) presents a rich overview of the applications of
signalling models. Signalling is an attempt to solve problems of asymmetric infor-
mation. In such a situation, the informed agent may have incentives to adopt
behaviours (signals) that reveal some of his unobservable characteristics to the
uninformed party. In Spence’s model, the signal is the level of schooling an
individual acquires. In fact, it is assumed that education conveys information
about unobservable and innate productivity.
Signalling games often have multiple equilibria. In some of these equilibria,
individuals with different characteristics send different signals (separating equilib-
ria); in others, they adopt the same behaviour such that signals are uninformative
(pooling equilibria). Various concepts of equilibrium refinements have been pro-
posed. In Section 3.1, we will apply the most common one, namely, the intuitive
criterion due to Cho and Kreps (1987).
(iii) Social distance and interdependent preferences Our daily lives provide plenty
of evidence in support of the hypothesis of interdependence of individuals’ pre-
ferences. Indeed, allowing for interdependent preferences involves acknowledging
that sentiments, like pride, esteem, shame or acceptance, are important in agents’
choices. The investigation of these issues began with early studies of consumption
patterns of individuals. For example, Duesenberry (1949) includes the average level
of consumption into the utility function that individuals have to maximize so that
an agent increases his utility if he is able to ‘beat the average’. A slightly different
methodology was followed by Pollak (1976), who models preferences as depending
upon other people’s past consumption. This setting leads to non-strategic behav-
iour by agents and the model becomes analytically more tractable. From a more
theoretical point of view, the incentives that move status-seeking individuals were
described first by Frank (1985). Robson (1992) considers the situation in which
people are interested in the ordinal rank they occupy in the distribution of wealth,
while Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) study the case in which utility is affected by
the amount of general consumption, as well as by the consumption of a particular
good which defines the status.
When preferences are defined by the relative amount of consumption or wealth,
it is natural to assume a tendency towards status-seeking behaviour. Yet, in other
contexts, a more conformist attitude may be the rule rather than the exception. The
classic work on conformism by Jones (1984) studied examples of social influences
in a college environment, in the army and in the workplace. Focusing on the last
example, Jones analysed the effort workers decide to exert. Given that extreme
behaviours are stigmatized, the slowest (fastest) members of the working group
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feel the pressure to speed up (slow down). Moreover, new workers imitate the
behaviour of older colleagues. Evidence for these forms of peer pressures also
comes from experiments (Falk and Ichino, 2006), while a more theoretical analysis
of the tendency towards conformism is given by Bernheim (1994).
To sum up, both status-seeking and conformist individuals care about the social
distance between them and some reference group. Externalities arise in both cases
and the social efficiency of the final outcome is not ensured. Using simple formula-
tions of utility functions, Akerlof (1997) showed that status-seeking behaviour
usually leads to overindulgence in the status-producing activity (i.e., over-
consumption).5 The outcome deriving from conformist behaviour can instead
range from underprovision to overprovision.
3. The model
3.1 A basic signalling model
Consider a population of potential workers.6 A proportion h2 (0, 1) is character-
ized by high productivity (h = 2), while the remaining proportion (l = 1 h) has
low productivity (l = 1). At least two firms compete in hiring the workers. These
firms are not able to distinguish between the two categories, based on the agents’
observable characteristics. Thus, if no signals are available, firms offer a wage equal
to average productivity w ¼  ¼ 2h þ l, with w 2 1; 2ð Þ. A more efficient out-
come can be achieved through signalling.
Assume that firms have some beliefs about the productivity of workers, i.e., they
think that there exists a certain level of education ~eð Þ such that if a worker i acquires
a level of education ei5~e, then he must be highly productive. Conversely if ei < ~e it
must be the case that the individual has low productivity. Given these beliefs and
the specific costs of education (high types have a cost which is half the cost of low
types), the utility functions of the workers take the following form:
UhðeÞ ¼ 2  1
2
e2 UlðeÞ ¼ 1  e2
Optimal educational levels must be subject to two incentive compatibility con-
straints which require high productivity individuals not to have any incentive to
pretend to be low productivity types and vice-versa:
2  1
2
~e251 152  ~e2
The constraints are satisfied by any ~e 2 1; ffiffi2p . For any level of ~e in the
interval, the types of agents send different signals (we restrict our attention to
..........................................................................................................................................................................
5 In an older paper, Akerlof (1976) describes the so-called rat-race mechanism: the probability of win-
ning a prize increases in the effort agents exert such that this results in an overprovision of effort.
6 The model is almost identical to the one introduced by Spence (1973) and provides the starting point
for a richer framework that we introduce in the next section.
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separating equilibria). In particular low productivity workers choose el = 0 and high
productivity workers choose eh ¼ ~e. Among all these perfect Bayesian equilibria, the
intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) selects the least cost-separating equilib-
rium: low productivity workers get the minimum level of education el ¼ 0
 
, while
high productivity workers choose eh ¼ 1. This is the lowest possible level of educa-
tion which cannot be profitably mimicked by the low types. It follows that the
average level of education is given by e ¼ h.
3.2 A richer framework: signalling and social distance
Spence’s signalling game models the choices of a single generation of workers.
Therefore, its results are essentially static. Results remain static even when consid-
ering a repeated version of the game (subsequent cohorts of workers facing the one-
shot signalling game). In fact, assuming that the average productivity is equal
among different generations, the average level of education would remain constant
over time at the level et ¼ h. In the standard model, firms’ beliefs match workers’
actual productivity such that neither workers nor firms have any incentive to
modify their strategies.7
We study a richer framework that may display some dynamics. In our game, two
subsequent cohorts of individuals participate in a signalling game. Every cohort is
formed by many agents and every agent is characterized by a certain level of pro-
ductivity and some social preferences. Both the productivity level and social pre-
ferences are assumed to be innate and fixed. In fact, prior to any decision of any
player, two simultaneous moves of Nature determine the composition of each
cohort. As in the standard model, agents are split into two classes according to
their (low or high) productivity. The other move of Nature defines the social
preferences with respect to the average education in society. Some individuals,
possibly the majority, simply do not have social preferences (lower index i for
independent) and are therefore analogous to the agents in Spence’s model; some
are characterized by a conformist behaviour (lower index c); some are status-
seeking (lower index s).
Each cohort of potential workers, whose size is normalized to 1, is thus parti-
tioned as shown in Table 1. Obviously kj2 [0, 1] for any k2 {i, c, s} and any
j2 {l, h} and Pk Pjkj = 1. The two cohorts are identical (same size and
same kj). Therefore, any movement in the average level of education will be
endogenously generated by the model and will not be due to population growth,
changes in the productivity level or in the social preferences of the agents.
Once Nature has moved, the following occurs:
t= 1: The first cohort of workers plays the signalling game.
t= 2: The second cohort of workers plays the signalling game.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
7 Indeed the original paper postulates self-confirming beliefs of the firms exactly to avoid studying a non
stationary system (Spence, 1973, p.360).
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We are interested in studying the dynamics of the average level of education.
We indicate with et the weighted average of the levels of education chosen by each
class at time t.
et ¼
X
k
X
j
kje
t
kj k 2 fi; c; sg; j 2 fl; hg
Before proceeding to the main analysis, we introduce and discuss a fundamental
assumption of the model: workers are myopic, while firms have perfect foresight.8
The idea is that every single worker ‘plays the game only once’. In other words,
workers are inexperienced players who may lack all the relevant information or may
have problems in processing it properly. Therefore, their decision about the level of
education to acquire is likely to be based on simplifying assumptions. In contrast,
firms are more sophisticated players, are constantly in the game and do not suffer
from these problems. Following on from some important recent contributions in
the behavioural literature, such an approach (myopic individuals interacting with
sophisticated firms) is one that is increasingly used in economics.9
In the context of our model, the myopia of workers means that individuals, in
choosing at time t their educational level at t+ 1, assume that the situation of the
education/labour market at time t+ 1 will be analogous to the situation observed
at time t.
This has two implications. First, agents observe ~et (the current level of education
that firms use to discriminate between high and low productivity individuals) and
assume that it will remain constant; therefore, they set Et ~etþ1ð Þ ¼ ~et . Second, non-
selfish agents (conformists and status-seekers) also set Et etþ1ð Þ ¼ et , i.e., they evalu-
ate their relative position using as a benchmark the current average educational
level and not the (possibly different) one that will arise at the time they enter into
the labour market.10
Table 1 The composition of each cohort of individuals
Low productivity (l) High productivity (h)
Independent (i) ail aih
Conformist (c) acl ach
Status-seeking (s) asl ash
..........................................................................................................................................................................
8 The Appendix shows how the results of the model change under the alternative and more traditional
assumption of both the workers and the firms being fully rational.
9 For instance, it underpins the analysis of so-called behavioural industrial organization where rational
firms face boundedly rational consumers (Oster and Scott Morton, 2005; Gabaix and Laibson, 2006).
10 This approach is common in the literature that considers intertemporal effects of interdependent
preferences (Pollak, 1976; Jones, 1984). Focusing on educational choices it is used, among others, by
Freeman (1971), Manski (1993) and Wilson et al. (2005). Manski (1993, p.49) writes: ‘youths observe
the incomes realized by members of the preceding generation who chose schooling, and they make
inferences from these observations’.
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Such myopic behaviour seems to be common in practice. Indeed, it can still pro-
vide a decently precise approximation if average levels of education move slowly over
time or if the time gap between today’s decision of enrolling in a certain degree and
tomorrow’s entry in the labour market is short. For instance, a student considering
the idea of taking a MBA will use the current average level of education to evaluate his
future relative position. Another, more practical, consideration that justifies the
myopic assumption is based on how people become informed about the available
educational choices and current labour market conditions. The usual sources of
information are provided by comments of (older) friends and by reading student
guides and statistics about the likelihood of getting a job with a certain degree. All of
these pieces of information describe the current situation, not the future.
Finally, this kind of myopic behaviour is also confirmed by a recent paper
(Brunello et al., 2004) which studies wage expectations of European college students.
The study shows that these expectations are substantially higher than the actual
wages. In other words, players hold incorrect expectations, i.e., they are myopic.11
People often admit to being disappointed by the wage they get conditional on their
level of schooling. This would not happen if individuals were fully rational.12
We assume however that firms are sophisticated and forward-looking such that
they always adopt an optimal screening policy. Therefore, in the first period (stan-
dard signalling game), they offer the wage w= 1 to any individual whose educa-
tional level is such that 04 e < 1; they offer w= 2 to all agents with e5 1. But in
the second period they may update their screening policy if they realize that,
because of the noise caused by social distance considerations, the critical value of
~e ¼ 1 is no more effective in discriminating among workers with different levels of
productivity.
3.3 Time t= 1
At the beginning of the first period, individuals’ choices are not influenced by social
preferences because of the absence of a current average level of education with
which to make a comparison. This stage of the game is analogous to the standard
signalling model presented in Section 3.1. It provides a starting point upon which
the model develops in t= 2. Low productivity workers attain a level of education
equal to 0, while high productivity individuals choose a level of 1. Optimal levels of
education are thus eil ¼ ecl ¼ esl ¼ 0 and eih ¼ ech ¼ esh ¼ 1. The average at the end
of t= 1 is e1 ¼ ih þ ch þ sh.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
11 Manski (2004) explicitly considers the effect of wage expectations on schooling choices. As he writes
(Manski, 2004, p.1336): ‘If experts disagree on the returns to schooling, is it plausible that youth have
rational expectations? I think not’.
12 An anonymous referee correctly pointed out that there is also a ‘statistical’ explanation for this
regularity. Assume wages are stochastic and workers expect to receive the average wage. Then the
majority of them will be disappointed given that wages distributions are usually distorted such that
the median wage is lower than the average wage.
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3.4 Time t= 2
At the beginning of the second period, a new cohort of potential workers faces their
educational choice. The choices of non-selfish players are now influenced by their
specific social preferences. Table 2 reports the utility functions of the six categories
of agents (subscripts are omitted whenever unnecessary). Wages appear in the
implicit form w as they depend on the individuals’ actual educational choices.
In particular, because of the assumption of myopia discussed in Section 3.2, work-
ers expect to receive the low wage w= 1 whenever they choose e < 1, while they
expect to receive the high wage w= 2 whenever e5 1.
Independent players are characterized by standard utility functions a` la
Spence. Utility functions for the players with interdependent preferences are slightly
more complex. Besides the part which captures the trade-off between wages and
the costs of education, there is an extra term that models social preferences.
In accordance with many classical contributions in the field (see Pollak, 1976;
Jones, 1984; Bernheim, 1994; Akerlof, 1997), this last term enters additively into
utility functions. For the reasons which have been explained in Section 3.2, this
social component is a function of e1, the current average level that workers of the
second cohort observe when deciding the level of education that they will have in
t= 2. In line with the utility functions presented in Spence’s original article (1973),
this additional part appears as an explicit function which is kept as simple as
possible.
Conformist individuals have a preference for being close to the average. The
social term in the utility function assigns an increasing cost whenever their educa-
tional choice differs from the average level e1. The utility functions of status-seeking
individuals are more problematic. A distinction has to be drawn between two cases.
If the level of education is below e1, then status ambitions are frustrated. In this
case, the utility function resembles those of conformist individuals but with a
higher cost for falling behind. However if the educational level is above e1, then
the individual’s utility increases in this distance. In this second case, the function
has to be corrected in some way. Consider, for example, the sh-class. With respect
to the case of e < e1, the symmetric formulation for e5e1 would be
Ush ¼ w  12 e2 þ 2ðe e1Þ2. However, this is a convex function @
2Ush
@e2 ¼ 3
 
such
that the first order condition would identify a minimum and not a maximum. To
have a meaningful solution, the utility function takes the form presented in Table 2.
Table 2 Utility functions of the six classes of individuals
Low productivity High productivity
Independent Uil ¼ w  e2 Uih ¼ w  12 e2
Conformist Ucl ¼ w  e2  ðe e1Þ2 Uch ¼ w  12 e2  ðe e1Þ2
Status-seeking
Usl ¼ w  e2  2 ðe e1Þ2 if e < e1
Usl ¼ w  e2 þ 2e1ðe e1Þ if e5 e1

Ush ¼ w  12 e2  2 ðe e1Þ2 if e < e1
Ush ¼ w  12 e2 þ 2e1ðe e1Þ if e5 e1

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Notice that the positive effect of an increasing distance e e1ð Þ is amplified if the
average level in t= 1 is high.
We already know from Section 3.1 that the optimal choices of individuals with
independent preferences are eil ¼ 0 and eih ¼ 1. The following subsections study
the behaviour of the other four classes of agents.
3.4.1 The ‘conformist + low productivity’ class (cl) Cl-individuals face the problem
max
e
Ucl ¼ w  e2  ðe e1Þ2 whose solution is given by e^cl ¼ 12 e1. Since e1 2 0;1½ 
it follows that e^cl 2 0; 12
 
. Given that e^cl < 1, agents expect to receive w= 1 because
firms correctly categorize them as low types. Is it always optimal to choose e^cl?
A possible alternative for a cl-agent is to choose ecl = 1 in which case, despite the
higher educational costs, the agent expects to receive the high wage w= 2. The
following figures provide a graphical analysis of the situation.
AÞ Ucl 1
2
e1
	 

¼ 1  1
2
e1ð Þ2 BÞ Ucl 1ð Þ ¼  e1ð Þ2þ2e1
Figure 1a plots the two utility functions for e¯12 [ 0, 1]. The optimal level of educa-
tion ecl (Fig. 1b) is then derived from the upper contour set of the functions A and B.
Up to a critical value (e¯1ffi 0.586), it is optimal to choose ecl ¼ 12. Above the threshold
it is instead more convenient to ‘jump’ to ecl ¼ 1. The intuition for such behaviour is
clear. As long as the average level is low, a cl-agent can conform to it without
investing too much in costly education. But if e¯1 is high enough, the incentives to
choose ecl ¼ 1 become dominant as the agent expects to receive the high wage w= 2.
3.4.2 The ‘conformist + high productivity’ class (ch) Workers belonging to the
ch-class have to solve max
e
Uch ¼ w  12 e2  ðe e1Þ2. The solution is given by
e^ch ¼ 23 e1. Given that e^ch 2 0; 23
 
, the expected wage is w= 1. On the other hand,
by choosing ech = 1, a ch-agent expects to receive w= 2. Figure 2a compares the
utilities arising from these two alternative choices.
AÞ Uch 2
3
e1
	 

¼ 1  1
3
e1ð Þ2 BÞ Uch 1ð Þ ¼ 1
2
 e1ð Þ2þ2e1
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Fig. 1. (a) Utility of the cl-class (b) Education of the cl-class
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Figure 2b shows that the optimal strategy is to choose ech ¼ 1 as long as the average
level in t= 1 is not too low (the critical value is e1 ffi 0:275). By doing so, agents are
effectively signaling their high productivity. Below the critical value, it is instead
more convenient to choose ech ¼ 23 e1. When the average is very low, pressures to
conform are stronger than incentives to signal actual productivity. Notice that the
ch-class and the cl-class may be pooled at e ¼ 1.
3.4.3 The ‘status-seeking + low productivity’ class (sl) The analysis of the behaviour
of status-seeking agents is more complex given that two different utility functions
have to be considered (see Table 2). Consider the case of a sl-agent. If the optimal
choice is below e1 then the problem is maxe Usl ¼ w  e2  2 ðe e1Þ
2 which has
soluztion e^sl ¼ 23 e1. Otherwise, the problem is maxe Usl ¼ w  e2 þ 2e1ðe e1Þ which
leads to e^sl ¼ e1. In both cases the worker expects to receive the low wage w= 1.
The comparison between these two educational choices and the other relevant
alternative (esl = 1) is depicted in Fig. 3a. Figure 3b displays the optimal level of
education of sl-agents.
AÞ Usl 2
3
e1
	 

¼ 1  2
3
e1ð Þ2 BÞ Usl e1ð Þ ¼ 1  e1ð Þ2 CÞ Usl 1ð Þ ¼ 1  2 e1ð Þ2þ2e1
Status-seeking individuals with low productivity always choose esl ¼ 1. The reason
is that in the original Spence model (see Section 3.1), low type individuals are
indifferent between esl ¼ 0 and esl ¼ 1. The least cost-separating equilibrium selects
esl ¼ 0. In our model, sl-individuals that choose esl ¼ 1 in t= 2 surely enjoy some
extra status-related utility. This additional factor makes esl ¼ 1 a dominant strategy.
3.4.4 The ‘status-seeking + high productivity’ class (sh) Two different situations
have to be considered also for the sh-class (See Table 2). For educational choices
that are smaller than e1, the problem is given by max
e
Ush ¼ w  12 e2  2 ðe e1Þ2.
The optimal choice is e^sh ¼ 45 e1 which implies w= 1. For values that are above e1, the
appropriate utility function is Ush ¼ w  12 e2 þ 2e1 e e1ð Þ. This function is max-
imized by e^sh ¼ 2e1 such that an sh-agent expects w= 1 if e1 < 12 and w= 2 if e15 12.
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Fig. 2. (a) Utility of the ch-class (b) Education of the ch-class
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Figures 4a and 4b illustrate the relevant utility functions and the optimal
choice esh.
AÞ Ush 4
5
e1
	 

¼ 1  2
5
e1ð Þ2 CÞ Ush 2e1ð Þ ¼ 1 with e1 < 1
2
%
BÞ Ush 2e1ð Þ ¼ 2with e%15 1
2
DÞ Ush 1ð Þ ¼ 3
2
 2 e1ð Þ2þ2e1%
As long as e¯14 0.5, a sh-player chooses esh% ¼ 1 given that the distance between
his choice and the average level is high enough to satisfy his status aspirations.
For any e¯1> 0.5, the player chooses e

sh ¼ 2e1. In this second case, the agent realizes
he needs a higher level of education in order to reach a satisfying status.
4. Education dynamics
Having solved for agents’ optimal behaviour, it is possible to focus on e2, the
average level of education at time t= 2. The following table summarizes the behav-
iour of the six classes of individuals. We use the letter  to indicate the critical value
at which players’ optimal choices display discontinuities.
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The average level of education is given by et ¼
P
k
P
j kje
t
kj for k2 {i, c, s} and
j2 {l, h} such that e1 ¼ ih þ ch þ sh.
Notice that the two cohorts of players with independent preferences (il and ih)
are characterized by a constant level of education over the entire game. The
model therefore predicts that the average level of education will remain constant
in a society where no player is influenced by issues of social distance in
educational achievements. This would actually be the case of a standard signalling
game repeated over time.
Proposition 1 The presence of individuals with interdependent preferences is
a necessary condition for observing an average level of education that changes
over time.
Proof If there are no agents with interdependent preferences then il + ih = 1.
Optimal educational choices are eil ¼ 0 and eih ¼ 1 both in t= 1 and in t= 2.
It follows that e2 ¼ e1 ¼ ih. «
Therefore, the average level of education can change only if optimal choices of the
four classes of individuals with interdependent preferences differ between different
periods. The average level of education in t= 2 is a weighted average of the optimal
choices by the six classes of individuals. These choices are functions of e1. Moreover,
e1 is a function of the kj, i.e., the proportions of the different classes. It follows that
e2 is a discontinuous function of the kj. More precisely, e2 takes the following form:
e2 ¼
ih þ cl 12 e1
 þ ch 23 e1 þ sl þ sh 0:0004e140:275
ih þ cl 12 e1
 þ ch þ sl þ sh 0:275 < e140:500
ih þ cl 12 e1
 þ ch þ sl þ sh 2e1ð Þ 0:500 < e140:586
ih þ cl þ ch þ sl þ sh 2e1ð Þ 0:586 < e141:000
8>>><
>>>:
The study of this function in its general form is not feasible because it involves
too many unknowns. Therefore, we focus on some special cases that are still useful
in understanding the effects that social preferences have on educational dynamics.
In particular, we study the cases in which, in addition to the two classes charac-
terized by independent preferences (possibly covering the vast majority of the
Table 3 Optimal choices at t= 1 and at t= 2
Class Prop. Product. h e1 e

2 for e¯14j e

2 for e¯1> j j
il ail 1 0 0 0 –
ih aih 2 1 1 1 –
cl acl 1 0 12 e1 1 0.586
ch ach 2 1 23 e1 1 0.275
sl asl 1 0 1 1 –
sh ash 2 1 1 2e¯1 0.500
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population), there are also some specific combinations of classes of individuals with
interdependent preferences.
4.1 Subpopulation with homogeneous social preferences
4.1.1 Independent and conformist individuals A society with independent and
conformist individuals implies the restrictions il +ih +cl +ch = 1 and
e1 ¼ ih þ ch. The function e2 and, most importantly, the difference in the average
educational levels between the two periods (e ¼ e2  e1) are:
e2 ¼
ihþcl 12 e1
 þch 23 e1 
ihþcl 12 e1
 þch
ihþclþch
8><
>: e¼
cl
1
2
e1
 þch 23 e1 1  0:0004e140:275
cl
1
2
e1
 
0:275< e140:586
cl 0:586< e141:000
8><
>:
In line with Proposition 1, the change in the average level of education (e) is
solely a function of the share of conformist individuals. At the same time, a closer
inspection of e provides an example which allows us to state the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 The presence of individuals with interdependent preferences is not
sufficient for observing an average level of education that changes over time.
Proof In a population such that il +ih +cl + ch = 1, consider the interval
e1 2 ½0; 0:275 and set e ¼ 0 (constant level of average education), i.e.,
cl
1
2
e1
 þ ch 23 e1  1  ¼ 0. This last condition holds if ~cl ¼  ~ch where
 ¼ 123e11
2e1
. Shares like ~cl and ~ch identify a stationary outcome of the game. «
Proposition 2 completes the statement of Proposition 1: Interdependent prefer-
ences are a necessary but not sufficient condition in order to observe a level of
average education that changes over time. We now study the conditions under
which the average level of education increases. These conditions turn out not to
be particularly demanding. Education is likely to increase in a society constituted
only of independent and conformist individuals. In particular, it increases if at least
27.5% of the population is highly productive.
Proposition 3 Average education can increase even in a society with no status-
seeking individuals. In particular:
(a) education increases for any e1 > 0:275, provided that there is at least one
conformist individual with low productivity;
(b) education can either increase or decrease for any e140:275.
Proof If there are no status seeking individuals then il +ih +cl +ch = 1 and
e1 ¼ ih þ ch. Then:
(a) for any e1 2 ð0:275; 1 the difference between e1 and e2 (see the formulation of
e above) is either e ¼ cl 12 e1
 
or e ¼ cl. In both cases e > 0 if cl> 0;
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(b) for any e1 2 ½0; 0:275 the difference between e1 and e2 is given by
e ¼ cl 12 e1
 þ ch 23 e1  1 . The proof of Proposition 2 shows that shares
such that ~cl ¼  ~ch identify stationary outcomes of the game. It follows that
average education increases if cl > ~cl and decreases if cl < ~cl. «
Notice that we do not use the terminology ‘equilibrium’ to refer to the results of
the game, since we have not analysed the behaviour of the other category of players,
namely the firms. Section 5 will elaborate more on this point. To analyse the
properties of the ‘outcomes’ described in the propositions, we introduce the fol-
lowing definition:
Definition 1 An outcome of the signalling game is called: perfectly separating if
ekl 6¼ eyh for any k 2 i;c; sf g and any y2 {i, c, s}; partly separating if ekl ¼ eyh for
some k2 {i, c, s} and some y2 {i, c, s}.
In a perfectly separating outcome (like the equilibrium of the game in t= 1),
players with different levels of productivity send different signals, i.e., they choose
different levels of education. This is often not the case in t= 2. Maintaining the
focus on a population with only independent and conformist individuals, consider
for instance the case in which e1 ¼ 0:6. Optimal choices in t= 2 (see Table 3) are
eil ¼ 0, eih ¼ 1, ecl ¼ 1 and ech ¼ 1. This is a partly separating outcome. Conformist
individuals with low productivity choose ecl ¼ 1, the same signal sent by high
productivity classes (ih and ch). Partly separating outcomes easily arise in popula-
tions where conformist and/or status-seeking individuals are present.
The model, therefore, shows that the presence of agents with interdependent
preferences can turn perfectly separating outcomes into partly separating ones.
Or, in other words, social distance considerations add noise to an otherwise per-
fectly separating equilibrium. Section 5 analyses how the hiring policies of firms
may be affected by this effect.
4.1.2 Independent and status-seeking individuals The presence of status-seeking
individuals can surely generate some positive educational dynamics. Consider a
population made of independent and status-seeking agents such that il +ih +
sl +sh = 1 and e1 ¼ ih þ sh. The average level of education in t= 2 and the
difference with respect to e1 are given by:
e2 ¼
ih þ sl þ sh
ih þ sl þ sh 2e1ð Þ
e ¼ sl 0:0004e140:500
sl þ sh 2e1  1Þð 0:500 < e141:000

Notice that, also in this case, signals can be misleading and a partly separating
outcome arises in t= 2: status-seeking agents with low productivity are pooled
together with highly productive workers. The analysis of e directly leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 Education cannot decrease in a society where there are no confor-
mist individuals.
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Proof The absence of conformist individuals (il +ih + sl +sh = 1) implies that
e5sl50. In particular, e > 0 if sl> 0. «
4.2 Conformist, low productivity plus status-seeking, high productivity
This case captures the situation in which the social preferences of agents are corre-
lated with their innate productivity. Some of the low productivity individuals learn
that they cannot emerge and consequently develop a taste for conformism. Some
high type individuals realize they have the talent and potential to be above average
and thus adopt status-seeking behaviour. Given that il + ih + cl +sh = 1 and
e1 ¼ ih þ sh, the function for e2 takes the following form:
e2 ¼
ihþcl 12 e1
 þsh
ihþcl 12 e1
 þsh 2e1ð Þ
ihþclþsh 2e1ð Þ
8<
: e¼
cl
1
2
e1
 
0:0004e140:500
cl
1
2
e1
 þsh 2e1 1ð Þ 0:500< e140:586
clþsh 2e1 1ð Þ 0:586< e141:000
8<
:
Education cannot decrease and increases if cl> 0. For low levels of e1, the
growth is driven by individuals of the cl-class who are trying not to fall behind.
The growth in education then becomes faster given that status-seeking individuals,
feeling their status in jeopardy, reach higher levels of schooling. Many outcomes are
partly separating because cl-individuals are indistinguishable from ih-individuals
for any e1 > 0:586.
4.3 The general case
The average level of education can both fall or rise when all the six classes of agents
are present. It is possible to derive some general results. Let us first consider the
uniform distribution defined by kj ¼ 16 with k2 {i, c, s} and j2 {l, h} such that
e1 ¼ 0:5. Optimal choices in t= 2 are eil ¼ 0, eih ¼ 1, ecl ¼ 0:25, ech ¼ 1, esl ¼ 1
and esh ¼ 1. The resulting average level of education is e2 ¼ 0:71 such that e > 0.
Consider next the situation depicted in Fig. 5. In this figure, both e1 (dashed line)
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and e2 (solid lines) are expressed as a function of cl (the proportion of conformist
individuals with low productivity) under the assumption that each of the other five
categories of workers covers 15 ð1  clÞ of the population. The graph shows that
education always increases between the two periods.
Given these two examples, it is easy to predict that, under very weak assumptions
regarding the kj, the average level of education will increase over time. In order to
have the opposite result, the composition of society has to be strongly biased towards
low productivity workers (e1 < 0:275 is a necessary condition) and the majority of
highly productive individuals must in addition adopt a conformist behaviour.13
4.4 Summary
The analysis of the previous subsections highlights the effects that interdependent
preferences can have on educational dynamics. In particular, it shows that the
presence of individuals who care about their relative position in the educational
distribution is a necessary but not sufficient condition for observing an average
level of education that evolves over time. Instead, it is a combination of social
preferences and productivity levels that triggers these dynamics. The assumptions
needed for the model to display a growing level of education are not particularly
challenging. For instance, average levels of education are likely to increase even in a
society where, in addition to standard agents with independent preferences, there
are just a few conformist individuals.
5. Behaviour of firms
The previous section focuses on the changes in average levels of education between
t= 1 and t= 2. These changes are the result of the behaviour of myopic workers who
set E1 ~e2ð Þ ¼ ~e1, i.e., they base their decisions on the assumption that firms use the
same hiring policies adopted in t= 1. In this section, we prove two results. First, we
show that if firms actually adopt such a hiring policy, they will probably incur
losses. Second, and as a consequence of the first result, we show how sophisticated
firms which anticipate correctly the educational trend adjust their screening strat-
egies in order to keep them effective.
Consider one of the main implications of the model, namely that the presence of
non-selfish individuals can easily turn perfectly separating outcomes into partly
separating ones. In these partly separating outcomes, workers with different pro-
ductivity acquire the same educational level such that the signals, being no more
perfectly correlated with workers’ productivity, become less informative. In fact,
from the firms’ points of view, agents with the same e are indistinguishable ex ante.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
13 As a numerical example consider the case in which il = 0.6, ih = 0.05, cl = 0.1, ch = 0.15, sl = 0.05,
sh = 0.05. The resulting average education at time t= 1 is e1 ¼ 0:25. Optimal choices at t= 2 are eil ¼ 0,
eih ¼ 1, ecl ¼ 0:125, ech ¼ 0:166, esl ¼ 1 and esh ¼ 1 such that e2 ¼ 0:19 and e2 < e1.
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Focusing on firms’ expected profits (firms break even when, for each employed
worker, the wage matches the productivity), Table 4 shows what would happen in
t= 2 if firms maintain the same screening strategies they used in t= 1, where they
set the discriminatory level at ~e2 ¼ ~e1 ¼ 1 and offer w= 1 to any worker with
04 e < 1 and w= 2 to any worker with e5 1.
The screening policy such that ~e2 ¼ ~e1 ¼ 1 may affect profits negatively in the
vast majority of cases. The likelihood of these negative effects is weakly increasing
with the level of average education. If e1 2 0; 0:275½ , firms may either gain or lose;
they may hire some conformist individuals with high productivity for the low wage
w= 1 (such that wch < ch), but they may also hire some status-seekers with low
productivity for the high wage w= 2 (such that wsl>sl). However, for any
e1 > 0:275, firms then run the risk of overpaying workers with a low level of
productivity: wsl>sl in the interval (0.275, 0.586] and both wcl>cl and wsl>sl
in the interval (0.586, 1]. Such an effect is in line with the initial intuition of the
paper. The average level of education is low when just a few individuals have a high
level of schooling. These few agents then stand out clearly and send an effective
signal to employers. In contrast, the average level of education is high when a
considerable fraction of the population has reached high levels of schooling.
In this case, signals become less informative and can damage a firm’s profitability.
Forward-looking firms react to such a trend in accordance with Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Forward-looking firms correctly anticipate educational trends and
optimally adjust their screening policies. In particular, they increase their educa-
tional requirements whenever the growth in education is such that signals become
noisy and potentially harmful.
Proof Table 4 shows that, with the policy ~e2 ¼ ~e1 ¼ 1, the probability of over-
paying some low productivity workers is weakly increasing in e1 and strictly posi-
tive for any e1 > 0:275 (assuming sl> 0). For example, for any e1 2 ð0:586; 1,
firms hire and overpay a worker with low productivity with probability
p ¼ clþslihþclþchþslþsh > 0. By setting ~e2 2 1; 2e1ð  such that ~e2 > ~e1 firms nullify
this risk (p = 0): in t= 2 only high productivity individuals (sh-class) get the
high wage w= 2. «
The behaviour described by Proposition 5 seems to be consistent with various
anecdotal evidence. For example, minimum educational levels required to obtain
Table 4 consequences on firms’ profits in t= 2
Interval of e¯1 Classes pooled together Effects on exp. profits
[0.000, 0.275] il, cl, ch at e < 1, ih, sl, sh at e = 1 mixed
(0.275, 0.500] ih, ch, sl, sh at e = 1 negative
(0.500, 0.586] ih, ch, sl at e = 1 negative
(0.586, 1.000] ih, cl, ch, sl at e = 1 more negative
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certain jobs have been increasing both in the public and private sector. At the same
time, Proposition 5 implies that myopic workers who fail to anticipate firms’
behaviours can receive a wage lower than the wage they expected to receive. This
is in line with empirical evidence (Brunello et al., 2004, show that European college
students substantially overestimate their future wages), as well as with the fact that
people often declare themselves to be disappointed with the wages they receive
given the level of schooling they acquired.
Moreover, and even if the analysis of a longer game is outside of the scope of this
paper, the fact that firms set ~e2 > ~e1 will also have some long-term effects. This
higher discriminating level will affect the choices of subsequent cohorts of indi-
viduals. Because of economic incentives and social distance considerations, differ-
ent categories of workers will progressively acquire this new higher level of
education which over time will again lose its separating power. According to this
argument, workers and firms are involved in a strategic interaction in which both
reaction functions are positively sloped such that an escalation in the level of
education takes place. A mechanism of this kind is likely to contribute to the
rise of average levels of education in Europe.
6. Conclusion
The dynamics produced through blending theories of signalling and social distance
can help explain the European educational trends of the past few decades. Under
very reasonable assumptions about the composition of society, the model endoge-
nously displays an ever-increasing average level of schooling. The presence of
status-seeking individuals is not a necessary condition for such growth given that
education can grow even in a purely conformist society provided there are enough
highly productive individuals. The observation that it is likely, at least for some
agents, that the level of schooling may be a way to reach a respectable social
position makes the result more robust. The model also rationalizes the fact that
as average education increases, signals get progressively less informative and firms
become more demanding. The growing number of new postgraduate degrees that
are awarded every year provides indirect evidence of the initial intuition. Today a
bachelor’s degree is a far less effective signal compared to 30 years ago; those who
want to stand out need something more.
The social welfare implications of the model are not positive. Asymmetric
information about workers’ productivity, externalities stemming from inter-
dependent preferences and social pressures not to fall behind in educational dis-
tribution suggest a tendency towards the overprovision of education. This indeed
seems to be the direction towards which many developed countries are moving.
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Appendix
The case with rational workers
The main body of the paper studies agents’ optimal choices and the dynamics of the
average level of education under the assumption of myopic workers and forward-
looking firms. Section 3.2 presents several reasons which support such an assump-
tion. However, for completeness, in this appendix we study the same problem under
the more traditional assumption of both workers and firms being forward-looking.
Forward-looking workers base their educational choice on the rational (i.e.,
ex-post correct) expectation about the future average level of education. More
precisely, their utility functions are similar to those presented in Table 2 but et1
is now replaced by et where et ¼
P
k
P
j kje
t
kj for k2 {i, c, s} and j2 {l, h}. This
requires workers to know, or to correctly anticipate, the composition of society
(the six parameters kj), the behaviour of the various classes of individuals (the six
optimal choices etkj) and the critical educational level (~et) that firms use in order to
discriminate among workers with different productivity.14
..........................................................................................................................................................................
14 Moreover a worker’s decision is now potentially strategic because his own choice will influence the
average level. We assume the population of workers to be large enough such as to make this effect
negligible.
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In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, workers anticipate that firms will design an
effective screening scheme. In particular, low productivity individuals realize that
firms cannot be deceived and rationally expect to receive the low wage w= 1.
Optimal choices are simply given by the maximization of their utility functions
such that eil ¼ 0, ecl ¼ 12 et and esl ¼ 23 et .
Firms anticipate these choices and could therefore set the discriminatory value at
~et ¼ 23 et þ. So long as ~et is smaller than 1, independent workers with low pro-
ductivity can profitably deviate from eil ¼ 0 to eil ¼ ~et (see the basic signalling
model in Section 3.1). The screening policy implemented by the firms is thus
more elaborate and takes the following form:
~et ¼ 1 if
2
3
et < 1
2
3
et þ otherwise

For highly productive individuals, independent agents choose eih ¼ ~et (as far as
~et <
ffiffi
2
p
). Conformist individuals have two options: either ech ¼ 23 et , in which case
w= 1 because they would be pooled with sl-individuals, or ech ¼ ~et which leads to
w= 2. Status-seeking individuals also have two options: either esh ¼ 45 et , which
implies w= 1 if 45 et < ~et and w= 2 otherwise, or e

sh ¼ 2et which leads to w= 1 if
2et < ~et and w= 2 otherwise.
Assuming that kj> 0 for any k2 {i, c, s} and any j2 {l, h}, the only solution
that leads to a positive level of average education and is consistent with an
optimizing rational behaviour of both the workers and the firms is the following:
eil ¼ 0, eih ¼ 1, ecl ¼ 12 et , ech ¼ 1, esl ¼ 23 et and esh ¼ 2et with ~et ¼ 1. For any
et 2 0; 32
 
, this equilibrium is surely perfectly separating. Average education
is given by et ¼ il ð0Þ þ ih ð1Þ þ cl 12 et
 þ ch 1ð Þ þ sl 23 et þ sh ð2etÞ which
implies:
et ¼ ih þ ch
1  12cl  23sl  2sh
Rational workers correctly compute the above expression and choose their
optimal level of education. As an example, consider the uniform case with
kj ¼ 16 with k2 {i, c, s} and j2 {l, h}. Then et ¼ 1217 and eil ¼ 0, eih ¼ 1, ecl ¼ 617,
ech ¼ 1, esl ¼ 817 and esh ¼ 2417. Note that et > 12 where 12 is the average level of educa-
tion that would have emerged in a standard signalling model where social
distance considerations play no role. Therefore social preferences change
traditional results even if both firms and workers are forward-looking. But notice
also that education remains constant over time: etþ1 ¼ et for any t5 1. In fact,
firms have no reasons to change their screening policy and workers belonging
to new cohorts face the same conditions and make the same choices as their
predecessors.
To sum up the analysis showed that:
(i) workers’ perfect foresight requires individuals to be able to forecast and
properly process a large, and possibly prohibitive, amount of information.
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(ii) workers’ perfect foresight leads to a static model where the average level of
education remains constant over time.
(iii) as a consequence, and in line with the main results of the paper, the
assumption of workers’ myopia is necessary to rationalize actual educational
trends and other related observations (average level of education that changes
over time, existence of partly separating outcomes).
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